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One of the most popular metaphors in constitutional
law is "the living tree". Originally coined by Lord Sankey
to justify a large and liberal interpretation of the British
North America Act, it has become commonplace to read
that, with the Charter, Canada "planted a living tree
capable of growth and expansion within its natural
limits".' On the tenth anniversary of its ceremonial
planting, it is instructive and revealing to take stock of
how the Charter tree has grown and what fruit it has
borne.
To begin with, it bears repeating what many are
prone to forget - that the Charter was planted.
Contrary to developing folklore, the Charter was not a
naturally germinating shoot in indigenous soil. It was the
product of ideological haggling and institutional seed-
trading. A deeply undemocratic process, the
constitutional circus of 1980 to 1982 was an exercise in
high politics and another occasion for the continuing
power play between Ottawa and the provinces. Indeed,
while planting the Charter tree, the founding fathers of
Canada's new constitutionalism also sowed the seeds of
contemporary discontent that sprouted at Meech Lake
and its aftermath.
Transplanted and spliced together from other cultures
by a brood of contending politicians, its origins are as
distinctly political as its continuing cultivation is politically
distinctive. Yet the Charter's planting is mistakenly
thought of in lyrical and mystical terms as a romantic
moment of national self-definition. The Charter sapling
has already become a national treasure, emblem and
monument - the constitutional equivalent of the fabled
maple.
In the exclusive care of its judicial custodians, the
Charter has blossomed and bloomed ever stronger each
season. After some initial hesitation, this privileged
group of enthusiasts has warmed to its national
undertaking and actively nurtured the Charter's expansive
growth. The Supreme Court of Canada has become a
markedly public law forum and constitutional matters
now dominate its docket. In the first few years of the
Charter, the courts upheld Charter claims and struck
down laws with relative abandon. Settling in to a more
measured pace, the Supreme Court began to worry about
its own competence to take such an active posture once
it grasped the importance of its invigorated role in
Canadian politics. Coincidentally, this stutter of
confidence and concern about its lack of expert
knowledge only occurred when the Court had to deal
with requests by unions and workers to enter the Charter
arboretum. But more about this later.
The major force of the "living tree" metaphor is, of
course, directed at the process of constitutional
interpretation. And it is in that context that Charter
judges have invoked its arboreal assistance and authority.
Despite bold statements by the present Chief Justice that
"adjudication under the Charter must be approached free
of any lingering doubts as to its legitimacy," 3 the judges
remain deeply (and rightly) troubled by the exact scope
and terms of their mandate to affect the constitutional
review of legislation. Mindful that the line between law
and politics is increasingly more imagined than real, they
have taken refuge under the convenient and capacious
shelter of the Charter's living tree. Although at times
reluctant, the judges have become, with the urging of a
sophisticated and ambitious legal corps, the new
aristocrats of Canadian culture.
At an early stage, the courts decided it was time to
thaw the "frozen rights" approach that was popular
under the discredited Bill of Rights. The Charter was not
to represent and hold in place those rights recognized and
declared to exist at its enactment in 1982.1 Instead, the
courts used this interpretive run-off to water the Charter
shrub and to feed its future growth. What might have
been a legal performance of ice-sculpting turned into a
judicial exercise in constitutional gardening. Under the
green-fingered encouragement of Bud Estey and Tony
Lamer, it was emphasized how care must be taken not to
"stunt the growth of the law and hence the community
it serves".' As Brian Dickson put it, the Charter "must,
therefore, be capable of growth and development over
time to meet new social, political and historical realities
often unimagined by its framers."'
In carrying through on this horticultural undertaking,
the Supreme Court emphasized at an early stage that, if
they are to produce a truly organic stand of
jurisprudence, they must not be hampered by the original
intentions of the Charter's foresters. To allow for growth
and adjustment, the Charter must not be held hostage to
the design 'and ambitions of those who supervised its
planting.' However, in typical fashion, the Supreme
Court has been less than consistent in its commitment to
this approach. When the Charter tree threatens to
become unruly and grows in unanticipated or undesired
directions, judges have been quick to invoke the superior
authority of the original political foresters to warrant the
odd bough being lopped off or the occasional branch
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trimmed. Again, this technique curiously has been relied
upon when the Charter challenge has come from one of
the under-privileged groups in society, mainly working
people and women. 8
In cultivating the Charter tree, judges have disagreed
strongly over the tools to be used and the horticultural
philosophy to be embraced. Among those gardeners who
have been elevated to the highest garden shed on
Canadian grounds, LaForest and Wilson represent the
most marked and opposing styles. The former takes a
more hands-off approach. Apart from an occasional act
of tree surgery, LaForest's philosophy is to rest content
with letting democratic nature take its course: "in the
absence of unreasonableness or discrimination, courts are
simply not in a position to substitute their judgment for
that of the Legislature."' The latter has a more
interventionist, hands-on style of constitutional
gardening. For Wilson, the challenge is to keep a strict
check on the Charter tree's growth so that its cut and
appearance comport with a very definite view of what a
Charter tree should look like: "the rights guaranteed in
the Charter erect around each individual, metaphorically
speaking, an invisible fence over which the state will not
be allowed to trespass. The role of the court is to map
out, piece by piece, the parameters of the fence." 1 °
Although the Court began with a fairly shared vision
of its horticultural responsibilities and the pruning
techniques to be used, it soon became apparent that
there was considerable disagreement among the eclectic
ensemble. Whereas thirteen of the first fifteen decisions
were unanimous, there were dissents in sixteen of the
next thirty-two. Moreover, it now seems that no
Supreme Court decision can be handed down without at
least one and sometimes as many as four dissents. This
lack of unanimity, while not conclusive, does little to
resist the broadening chorus of criticism that the work of
the court is ideological in nature and operation.
Accordingly, instructed and informed by only their
amateur gardening skills, the judges have become
political topiarists and have shaped the Charter much to
their own preferences.1 1 As such, the Charter's growth
and expansion has come to look naturally conservative,
favouring established interests and traditional values over
more progressive positions. With a bunch of judicial
gardeners that are drawn exclusively from the ranks of
the middle-class and middle-aged, this should come as
little surprise. This is perhaps best illustrated by the
double-limbed, means/ends interpretation of s. 1 which
gives heavily presumptive weight to a retention of the
status quo.
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The Charter tree was planted with the proclaimed
intention of providing constitutional shelter and civic
nourishment to ordinary Canadians. In this it has surely
failed. While the courts have opened themselves up for
constitutional challenges through a liberalization of the
rules of standing and non-party intervention, the price of
admission remains outrageously high. Estimates range
between $100,000 and $300,000 to take a case all the
way to the Supreme Court of Canada. With its dazzlingly
colourful and seductively scented foliage, it has proved
to be more an ornamental shrub for the bulk of Canadian
citizens. It tickles the aesthetic fancy, but does little to
satisfy more substantive cravings.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with his mission,
Joe Borowski's ten-year odyssey through the courts is a
travesty of any kind of democratic process. Having first
filed his case in September 1978, it took three years,
$150,000 and a visit to the Supreme Court to establish
that he had standing to bring his constitutional challenge.
In October 1988, after two more trials, seven years and
another $200,000, Borowski was back in the Supreme
Court only to be told that his case was moot because of
the recent decision in Morgentaler. At the very least,
Borowski was entitled to a more conclusive and more
expeditious decision on the validity of his constitutional
challenge. In such circumstances, constitutional
gardening becomes an indulgence that no sane society
should endure or encourage. There are more nourishing
and constructive pursuits to be fostered.
Confined to a rather elite arboretum, it is the
corporate sector that has gained the most access to the
Charter tree. Able to influence and reinforce the judges'
horticultural instincts, corporations and their members
have procured a constitutional crop that is to their liking.
They have persuaded the courts to recognize their rights
to free speech, religion, equality, to be tried within a
reasonable time and to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure. It is a bumper crop and must have
surpassed even the most optimistic expectations of the
corporate establishment.
In contrast, workers and other ordinary Canadians
have been hard pressed to catch sight of, let alone
benefit from, the Charter's reputed bounty. Efforts by
the unions to secure a reasonable share of the Charter's
fruit in the form of a right to strike or bargain collectively
have been bluntly and unsympathetically rebuffed. So
bleak is the situation that, as a face-saving manoeuvre,
some union lawyers are minded to pass off as victories
those decisions that simply leave in place benefits that
took long years of political struggle to obtain.13
Furthermore, by way of adding insult to injury, the
Supreme Court has refused to grant rights to unions
because they are not fundamental and are not expressed
dimensions in the Charter. Remembering the economic
raison d'dtre of corporations and that corporations are
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nowhere mentioned in the Charter, Le Dain's conclusions
are perverse:
Since trade unions are not one of the groups
specifically mentioned by the Charter, and they are
overwhelmingly, though not exclusively, concerned
with the economic interests, it would run counter to
the overall structure and approach of the Charter to
accord by implication special constitutional rights to
trade unions."'
Indeed, the Charter's fruit has a delicate blush, is
easily bruised and appeals to an acquired taste. While
there has been the occasional produce for more general
consumption of benefit, its choice berries only satisfy the
palates of the privileged few. Costly to reap, it has not
been the substantial and sustaining harvest that was
promised or hoped for. For instance, equality rights have
been effectively ambushed and held hostage by the more
privileged sectors of society. The provision has been
used to deal with charges such as drunk driving and the
manufacture of pop cans. In the first three years after its
planting, there were approximately 600 court decisions
under the equality provisions and 44 or 7% of these
involved sexual equality. Most alarmingly, only 7 of the
44 cases were initiated by or on behalf of women; the
other 37 decisions were based on claims by men. 6
Perhaps the most serious problem with this
constitutional conifer is that the maintenance of its
luxuriant growth seems to have become almost an end in
itself. Casting a large shadow over the body politic, the
Charter has insatiable organic needs. It requires constant
and expensive attention, stymies the cultivation of other
promising popular saplings and, most worryingly, sucks
the political soil dry of its vital democratic spirit. This is
particularly true of the failure by embattled and
pusillanimous politicians to exercise their power to
override the Charter under s. 33.
A topical illustration of the Charter tree's deleterious
effect on other Canadian political fauna is the
government's unwillingness to place spending limits on
any referendum campaign. Taking the government at its
word (a dangerous course), it defended its decision on
the basis that such limits would be vulnerable to
successful challenge under the Charter. As the purpose
of spending limits is to ensure that democratic decision-
making does not become hostage to the interests and
views of the wealthy, the effect of the Charter has been
to handcuff efforts to retain the semblance of democratic
legitimacy that exists in Canadian politics. Wealthy
individuals and corporations can use the broad reach of
the Charter to shelter them from the refreshing rains of
participatory democracy. Rather than be a democratic
haven from a world of unequal wealth and power for the
least advantaged, the Charter tree has become an elitist
hideaway for the privileged sectors of society who seek
to evade the egalitarian instincts of a democratic polity.
While it is too late to nip this constitutional scion in
the bud, it is not too soon to prune the Charter tree to
more modest proportions. The judicial gardeners can
best fulfil their democratic mandate by engaging in such
a worthy project. Reduced to a less prominent position
on the Canadian political landscape, the Charter tree
might have a useful and limited role to play. Small is not
only ecologically beautiful, but is also constitutionally
sound.
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University, Toronto.
1. Edwards v. Attorney General for Canada, [ 19301 A.C. 124 at
136.
2. See Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 and Alberta Labour
Reference, [19871 1 S.C.R. 313.
3. Re Motor Vehicle Act, [19851 2 S.C.R. 486 at 497 per
Lamer J.
4. See Big M Drug Mart, [1986 1 S.C.R. 103.
5. See Re Motor Vehicle Act, supra, note 3 and Law Society of
Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [19841 1 S.C.R. 357.
6. Hunter v. Southam Inc., [19841 2 S.C.R. 145 at 155.
7. See Re Motor Vehicle Act, supra, note 3.
8. See Alberta Labour Reference, supra, note 2 at 313 per
Maclntyre and Morgentalerv. R., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 per Macintyre.
9. See Edward Books Limited v. R., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
10. See Morgentaler, supra, note 8.
11. See Petter and Hutchinson, Private Rights and Public Wrongs:
The Liberal Lie of the Charter (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 278; Hutchinson
and Petter, Rights in Conflict: The Dilemma of Charter Legitimacy
(1989), 23 U.B.C.L.J. 531; and Hutchinson and Petter, Daydream
Believing: Vision Reformalism and the Constitution (1990), 22
Ottawa L. Rev. 365.
12. See Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf (Or the Beatification of the
Charter) (1991) 41 U.T.L.J. 332.
13. See Lavigne v. OPSEU, [19911 2 S.C.R. 211.
14. See Alberta Labour Reference, supra, note 2.
15. See G. Brodsky and S. Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights
For Women: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back? (Ottawa:
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1989).
POINTS OF VIEW / POINTS DE VUE
An occassional paper series published by
the Centre for Constitutional Studies.
0 Where Should the Majority Rule? Reflections on Non-
Territorial Provinces and Other Constitutional
Proposals by David J. Elkins
Social Charter Issues After Beaudoin-Dobbie by Gwen
Brodsky
